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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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
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# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**




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FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

## CONTENTS

### ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Moscow Supports Cairo's Pullback Demand, Denigrates U.S. Alert. . .	1
Peking Hits Cease-Fire, Stresses U.S. "Intimidation" of USSR. . .	9
East European Allies Mark Time on Quest for Settlement. . . . .	11

### EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Brezhnev Conveys Optimism Over Detente, Minimizes Obstacles . . . .	13
Moscow Exploits U.S.-Europe Rift Over Middle East Policy. . . . .	17
Brezhnev Details Moscow's Views on Force Reductions . . . . .	21

### INDOCHINA

Hanoi Radio Suspends Broadcast of "Chien Binh" Articles . . . . .	24
DRV Defense Minister Giap Has Again Dropped Out of Sight. . . . .	24
Pham Van Dong Delegation Concludes Czechoslovak-DRV Aid Pact. . . .	25

### USSR

Theoretical Dispute Over Economic Planning Continues Unabated . . .	27
PRAVDA Official Rebukes Soviet Press for Softness on Zionism. . . .	30

### NOTE

World Peace Congress. . . . .	32
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### APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . .	1
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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 1 -

## ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

## MOSCOW SUPPORTS CAIRO'S PULLBACK DEMAND, DENIGRATES U.S. ALERT

The first explicit Soviet acknowledgment of the worldwide U.S. "precautionary" military alert ordered on 25 October came in a brief TASS statement early on the 27th. The statement was issued a few hours after President Nixon had explained at his press conference, on the evening of the 26th, that the alert had been prompted by indications of Soviet plans to send a substantial military force to the Middle East. TASS mentioned neither the President's nor Kissinger's remarks but rejected "absurd" justifications by "officials" for the military alert on the grounds that some actions of the Soviet Union "allegedly" gave cause for concern.

Brezhnev in his speech to the World Peace Congress in Moscow on the 26th had seemed to be alluding to the U.S. alert when he spoke cryptically of actions "in some NATO countries" disseminating "fantastic speculations" concerning Soviet intentions in the Middle East. Brezhnev disclosed that in response to President as-Sadat's 24 October request for U.S. and Soviet troops, the USSR had already sent "representatives" and hoped the United States would do the same. He characterized the 25 October Security Council resolution establishing a UN emergency force to supervise the cease-fire as a "useful decision," and placed stress on the "significance" of Arab-Israeli negotiations. Brezhnev accused Israel of ignoring Security Council demands for withdrawal of troops to the 22 October positions, and propaganda has underlined Egypt's insistence on an Israeli pullback.

Moscow reports of the President's press conference came belatedly some nine hours after the release of the TASS statement. While ignoring the President's reference to the possible dispatch of Soviet military forces, the reports highlighted his statement that the United States would send observers to the Middle East if this were requested by the UN secretary general. Moscow since then has only briefly alluded to either the Soviet "representatives" in Cairo or possible U.S. observers. The cautious treatment of the Middle East situation has focused on Security Council discussions and UN measures to dispatch and position observers and UNEF troops.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 2 -

KISSINGER                      Soviet media selectively reported Kissinger's  
 PRESS CONFERENCE            remarks in his 25 October press conference  
                                  on U.S. and Soviet activities related to the  
 Middle East war. Both prompt TASS reports on the 25th and PRAVDA  
 on the 26th struck a positive note in citing the Secretary as  
 saying that on the basis of talks with Brezhnev and constant  
 diplomatic contacts, he had every reason to suppose that "a common  
 standpoint can be reached between us in our efforts" to achieve  
 a stable peace in the Middle East. Both reported his expression  
 of belief that during his talks in Moscow the weekend of the  
 20th a formula had been worked out which "in our opinion, was  
 acceptable to all sides and which, as we continue to believe, was  
 a just settlement of this tragic conflict."

However, much of Kissinger's explanation of developments was left  
 obscure by the Soviet accounts. While TASS noted his opposition  
 to the idea of sending U.S. and Soviet troops to insure implementa-  
 tion of the cease-fire--as requested by President as-Sadat on  
 the 24th--this was not included in the PRAVDA account. PRAVDA  
 reported his statement that the United States did not consider itself  
 to be in a state of confrontation with the Soviet Union but gave no  
 indication of why anyone should think such a situation might exist.  
 Thus, there was no mention of the U.S. military alert and Kissinger's  
 explanation that it was a precautionary measure taken in the face  
 of indications of Soviet actions in the Middle East.

BREZHNEV SPEECH            Brezhnev's speech to the World Peace Congress in  
                                  Moscow, anticipated but not announced for the  
 opening day on the 25th, was not delivered until the following day,  
 a delay apparently occasioned by the Middle East crisis. Brezhnev  
 made no specific mention of the U.S. alert but it was clearly in  
 mind in a passage which criticized Israel and wound up deploring  
 actions he attributed to "some NATO countries." Without mentioning  
 the United States by name, he referred three times to "outside  
 forces" and "outside patronage" in support of Israel's "adventurist  
 course." Brezhnev did not identify "those" who "recklessly"  
 violate peace, but he added that "the experience of recent days  
 makes us vigilant" and called for "urgent and resolute measures"  
 to insure implementation of the UN resolutions on a cease-fire  
 and troop withdrawal.

He disclosed that in response to as-Sadat's request for U.S. and  
 Soviet forces--which Brezhnev described as "representatives"--  
 the Soviet Union had already sent such representatives, and he  
 expressed hope that the United States "will act in the same way."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 3 -

Without elaboration he added that the USSR was considering "other possible measures" that the situation might call for. Brezhnev described as a "useful decision" Security Council Resolution 340, adopted on the 25th, establishing a UN Emergency Force, but placed more emphasis on Resolution 338 which called for the cease-fire, implementation of Resolution 242 of 1967, and the beginning of talks. In what might have been a response to Kissinger's press conference remark that cooperative action precludes unilateral action, Brezhnev declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to cooperate with all countries concerned in normalizing the Middle East situation. But he went on to say that such cooperation could not be furthered by actions which he attributed to "some NATO countries" which "artificially fanned passions by disseminating all sorts of fantastic speculations" about Soviet intentions in the Middle East. In the present situation, Brezhnev said, "a more responsible, honest, and constructive approach" would be "more appropriate." Brezhnev's target was made clear in an IZVESTIYA article, reported by TASS on the 30th, which employed his description of the proper approach to international affairs in the course of criticizing the "totally unjustified" U.S. alert.

An Arabic-language broadcast on the 26th summarizing Brezhnev's remarks on the Middle East noted his expressions of readiness to cooperate with all countries concerned and said he denounced "the spreading of various false reports about Soviet intentions" in the Middle East. It also reported Brezhnev's announcement that Soviet "representatives" had been sent to the area and his hope that the United States would take the same step. Moscow's only subsequent reference to its "representatives" came in a broadcast in Arabic on the 28th which attributed to Cairo papers a report that contacts had been made concerning the participation in the UN observer group of "some 70 Soviet observers who are currently in Cairo."

Brezhnev's remarks on substantive questions of a Middle East settlement reiterated established Soviet positions with the notable exception of his emphasis on negotiations.

+ Up to now, Moscow had consistently gone along with Arab rejection of Israeli-Arab negotiations under conditions of continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories. Brezhnev pointed to the call for talks embodied in Resolution 338--which the Soviet Union co-sponsored--and declared that "the significance of such talks cannot be overestimated." Echoing the language of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 4 -

the resolution that the talks should be held under "appropriate auspices," he went on to assert that the Soviet Union was ready to make "its constructive contribution to this cause." In the only elaboration thus far provided by Soviet media, PRAVDA commentator Zhukov said in a Moscow television talk, reported by Moscow radio on the 27th, that talks should be held under appropriate aegis, "that is, under the trusteeship and with the help of specific states and international organizations."\* Not surprisingly, Moscow ignored Kissinger's remark in his press conference on preliminary conversations with Ambassador Dobrynin about site, participation, and procedure for the talks, indicating joint American-Soviet auspices.

+ Urging implementation of Resolution 242, Brezhnev cited the November 1967 resolution as foreseeing the withdrawal of Israeli forces from "all" occupied territories. The 27 October PRAVDA version of Brezhnev's speech deleted the word "all," perhaps reflecting no more than adherence to the ambiguous language of Resolution 242 which calls for Israeli withdrawal. Since the 1967 war Moscow has supported the Arab position on total withdrawal but Soviet elite pronouncements have not always been consistent in specifying "all" territories. Brezhnev made the usual reference to Palestinian "lawful rights," noting that Resolution 242 calls for a just settlement of the refugee problem.

+ Brezhnev reiterated, with additional stress, the formulation which in effect supports Israel's right to exist as a state, declaring the Soviet Union to be firmly in favor "of all, I repeat all" states and peoples in the Middle East being insured peace, security, and inviolability of frontiers. And he again pledged Soviet readiness to take part in "corresponding guarantees," a position he had stated in his 30 March 1971 speech at the CPSU 24th Congress, when he said the USSR was prepared to join powers which are permanent members of the Security Council in creating international guarantees for a Middle East settlement. The Soviet Mideast proposals made public by PRAVDA in January 1969 had suggested Security Council adoption

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\* Moscow's Arabic-language service on the 29th reported Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Hatim as saying the talks must take place within the UN framework. He called for convening an "international conference on peace in the Middle East" as soon as possible, with participation by representatives of Arab countries, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Security Council permanent members.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 5 -

of a decision on guarantees for Arab-Israeli borders, "possibly not excluding" guarantees by the council's permanent members. The 1969 proposals also called for agreement between the sides on secure and recognized frontiers and guarantees of the territorial inviolability and political independence of each state in the region. More recently, in speeches on 10 and 11 July this year, Brezhnev had called for "restoration" of the frontiers of the Middle East states so that security of the area's countries could be protected, and had said that the state frontiers of all the region's countries must be guaranteed.

## NIXON PRESS CONFERENCE

The TASS account of the President's 26 October press conference--and a slightly truncated version broadcast by Moscow's domestic service the same day--selectively quoted the President to point up the intention of the two powers, despite differing aims in the Middle East, to avoid confrontation in the area and to work to achieve a settlement. The TASS account opened by highlighting the President's announcement at the beginning of his press conference that the United States would send observers to the Middle East if this was requested by the UN secretary general, and that the United States had reason to believe such a request would be forthcoming.\* TASS then turned to the President's assessment that prospects for the future were more hopeful than in the past week, since the Soviet Union and the United States had reached agreement to exert efforts "toward achieving a settlement between the interested parties." (The President in fact referred to agreement to "participate in trying to expedite the talks" between the parties.)

TASS also noted the President as saying the events of the past week had shown that the United States and the Soviet Union "have now come to agree" that confrontation in the Middle East is not in their interests, and that "if we want to avoid this, we must use our influence" to achieve a permanent peace. The President believed, TASS said, that "if we were not now engaged in a course of easing tension," it is possible that a serious conflict could have occurred in the Middle East.

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\* A TASS dispatch from Washington on the 26th had reported State Department spokesman McCloskey as announcing that the President "has decided" to send unarmed U.S. observers to the Middle East.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 6 -

The President's remarks on the U.S. military alert were handled in guarded, cryptic fashion and not broached until almost the end of the account. Without acknowledging his reference to the Soviet Union, TASS said the President "tried to justify the adoption of the decision taken" to place U.S. forces "in certain regions" on an "enhanced state of combat readiness." It did not attribute to the President any explanations for this action other than to say that "without citing a source he referred here to 'information' which allegedly gave rise to the need to adopt, as he put it, 'precautionary measures.'"

TASS linked the "information" with Soviet actions in awkward fashion by going on to note that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in an earlier press conference "was obliged to admit that he had 'no information' about any actions by the Soviet Union which gave grounds for concern." TASS' only comment was to cite the assessment of the "international public" that the United States' "precautionary measures" were "far from promoting the easing of international tension which, in Nixon's words, the United States is striving for."

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS      TASS' reportage on Middle East developments has reflected Cairo's insistence on an Israeli pullback to the positions held at the time of the 22 October cease-fire. Thus TASS in the first Soviet report on as-Sadat's 31 October press conference cited him as saying that Israeli return to the 22 October positions would be the first step toward the establishment of peace. TASS also reported him as stressing Egypt's readiness to cooperate with the United Nations for immediate implementation of the cease-fire resolution and talks between the sides.

In the same vein, TASS reported the "UNEF call" for a meeting of Egyptian and Israeli military representatives to discuss "the question of return to the 22 October cease-fire lines." Jerusalem radio reports said that the meeting, arranged with U.S. mediation at Israeli initiative, was to discuss cease-fire arrangements and supplies to Egypt's Third Army. Moscow has shown reluctance to broach the predicament of the Third Army cut off on the east bank of the canal, as well as the issue of POW exchange. TASS reported without explanation on the 29th and 30th that supply trucks had reached the Third Army and supplies were "passing normally." The POW issue was acknowledged in a TASS report on the 30th that Egypt had announced that a POW exchange would be effected after Israel returned to the 22 October positions.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 7 -

Soviet media have briefly noted the arrival of as-Sadat's envoy, Isma'il Fahmi, in Washington for talks. TASS reported on the 30th that the visit was described by State Department spokesman McCloskey as the beginning of U.S.-Egyptian discussions on prospects for Arab-Israeli talks to settle the conflict. Secretary Kissinger was reported as having said the discussions dealt with the "entire complex of problems, including the cease-fire."

Moscow also announced the arrival in Cairo on the 30th of Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov for talks with as-Sadat. While Soviet media do not normally mention Soviet ambassadors' diplomatic contacts, a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 26th reported that as-Sadat had received Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov. They also met on the 27th, according to Cairo reports, and AL-AHRAM said on the 28th that Cairo had received a note from Moscow the previous day to the effect that the USSR was in constant contact with the United States and the UN secretary general to stress that a return to the 22 October cease-fire lines was a "basic position." After this took place, the second and third clauses of Resolution 338 must be implemented immediately.

Moscow has provided few details of the Security Council discussions on composition of the UN observer and force groups. TASS on the 25th reported council adoption that day of Resolution 340, submitted by eight nonaligned nations, which provided for the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force under the council's guidance and comprised of personnel from UN member states with the exception of permanent members of the Security Council. Soviet delegate Malik was cited by TASS as saying the USSR supports the resolution but adding that the principle of "fair geographic representation" should be followed with respect both to the UN observers and the UNEF. Malik called it "intolerable" that the present 200-man observer group was drawn almost entirely from Western countries and said the "additional contingent of observers" should be formed of representatives of socialist and nonaligned countries.

TASS on the 26th summarized some elements of the UN secretary general's report on the basic principles and tasks of the UNEF, noting that contingents would be selected in consultation with the council and the parties concerned, "bearing in mind an adequate geographic representation." Reporting council adoption of the report on the 27th "with amendments," TASS did not mention that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 8 -

the point on composition was changed to read "bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation." TASS did report Malik as saying that the Soviet delegation did not object to council endorsement of the report although it had "a number of reservations," and reminding the council of the USSR's "well-known" position on financing of UN peacekeeping operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 9 -

## PEKING HITS CEASE-FIRE, STRESSES U.S. "INTIMIDATION" OF USSR

A 26 October PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and a speech by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei the following day provided the first authoritative comment on the U.S.-Soviet cease-fire resolutions, routinely castigating them as superpower efforts to reimpose a "no war, no peace" situation. But while playing the propaganda theme that the superpowers have worked together to suppress the Arab struggle, Peking has stressed that the main factor is still U.S.-Soviet contention. Thus, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial pointed to the use of U.S. pressure to "intimidate" the Soviet Union and have it curb Arab military actions while NCNA has portrayed the U.S. military alert as an effective brake on Soviet ambitions.

As usual the Soviet Union bore the brunt of Peking's criticism, with the Chinese charging Moscow with stifling the Arab struggle in favor of the USSR'S own selfish interests and with allowing the Israelis "to hang their swords over the heads of the Arab peoples." The editorial reaffirmed Peking's long-standing position that no stable peace would be possible until Israel withdraws from occupied Arab territory and provision is made for Palestinian national rights; it sidestepped reference to Chinese support for the Arab struggle, but Chi Peng-fei duly promised Chinese backing in general terms.

Chinese UN representatives have continued to play up the allegation that the superpowers have heavy-handedly used the Security Council to "rubber stamp" their joint resolutions. In a speech during debate on the second resolution on 23 October, however, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in effect acknowledged Arab support for the resolution when he said that "only after taking into consideration the desire of certain countries" did China refrain from vetoing the cease-fire resolution. Chiao reiterated his view that the "broad masses of the Arab people will never allow themselves to be controlled by the two superpowers perpetually." In subsequent Security Council debates, PRC representatives labeled the UN peace-keeping force a superpower instrument for "further international intervention and control in the Middle East" and served notice that China will not contribute to its support.

U.S. ALERT      Peking reportage on the U.S. general military alert has presented the action as a blunt and effective effort to block the unilateral dispatch of Soviet troops to the Middle East under the guise of peace-keeping forces. A 26 October NCNA report charged that Moscow wanted to strengthen its position in the area by effecting a "de facto military

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 10 -

occupation" and highlighted particularly U.S. opposition evident in Secretary Kissinger's remarks to the press on the 25th, noting his affirmation that President Nixon's decision to call the alert was to "make clear our attitude toward unilateral steps." Peking quoted approvingly Kissinger's warning that the United States would oppose attempts "by any country" to achieve a predominant position in the area or seek its own ends under the cover of detente. Similarly, a 30 October NCNA report played up remarks on the Middle East by President Nixon during his 26 October press conference that he decided on the alert so as to leave "little to the imagination of how we would react" to a unilateral Soviet move. The report also noted the continuing buildup of U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the area, observing that the two powers are "strengthening their positions for contention in the Middle East."

Peking pickups of Western press accounts have portrayed Moscow as timidly giving ground before U.S. pressure. NCNA noted on the 26th a UPI report that Moscow fell into line with U.S. demands "within hours" after the U.S. alert began. More pointedly, a 27 October NCNA replay of French press reports said that the "bluff of Brezhnev" to send forces to the Middle East had failed in the face of U.S. resolve because "as always, when one hits the table with equal arms, the Russians retreat." Drawing a direct parallel with Khrushchev's failure during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, NCNA quoted a French paper's rhetorical query whether Brezhnev would not accordingly be required to pay "the same price that Khrushchev paid."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 11 -

## EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES MARK TIME ON QUEST FOR SETTLEMENT

In messages and speeches to the World Peace Congress which opened in Moscow on 25 October, Moscow's East European allies expressed pro forma support for a Middle East political settlement, denounced Israeli "aggression," and demanded withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territories. The thrust of most East European comment on the U.S. military alert and the President's press conference has been noticeably circumspect except for Yugoslavia, which has been most outspoken in condemning the U.S. alert for undermining detente and endangering world peace.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA      A Prague domestic broadcast of the 27th on the President's press conference included muted criticism of the alert, noting that the President "tried to justify his decision" on the basis of "alleged reports" indicating a need for "preventive measures." Such measures, it added, "definitely did not contribute toward reducing international tension." It also said the President had announced that the alert "had been cancelled for the forces in Europe" but was still in force "in some other areas." The report highlighted at the outset the President's optimism about prospects for a settlement. Another Prague radio report of the press conference, earlier on the 27th, noted additionally that President Nixon "described the danger of deliveries of Arab oil being stopped as one of the most important factors influencing the intensification of U.S. efforts" to find a solution to the crisis.

HUNGARY      Budapest radio on the 27th reported only briefly the President's optimism regarding the Middle East and his readiness to send civilian observers if requested to do so by the United Nations. The broadcast was otherwise devoted to reporting without comment the President's remarks on the Watergate affair. Prior to the press conference, a commentary carried by MTI earlier on the 26th bluntly charged the President with using the Middle East crisis to divert attention from Watergate. On the 30th, a Budapest radio report on the Administration's decision to request Congress to suspend consideration of the most-favored-nation issue included a statement that "observers in Washington have expressed surprise that the Nixon government is trying to link" the question of a Middle East settlement with the expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 12 -

YUGOSLAVIA      The authoritative Belgrade daily BORBA devoted an editorial on the 27th to the U.S. alert, declaring that it had fed the flames of a "grave war crisis" not only in the Middle East but throughout the world. It went on to charge that the alert represented a threat of "a direct intervention in one of the key hotbeds of war" as well as a threat to the policy of detente. The editorial did not balance its harsh censure of the United States with any criticism of the Soviet Union. The Zagreb daily VJESNIK, also on the 27th, likewise ridiculed the President's statement that the greatest crisis since 1962 had been averted "thanks to detente." On the U.S. alert, the paper rhetorically questioned the stability of a relationship between the great powers resting on force or the threat of force.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 13 -

## EAST-WEST RELATIONS

## BREZHNEV CONVEYS OPTIMISM OVER DETENTE, MINIMIZES OBSTACLES

Moscow has sought to minimize the effects of the Middle East conflict on East-West relations by emphasizing the positive achievements of Soviet detente diplomacy and reaffirming its goals. This was the stance Brezhnev adopted in his wide-ranging speech to the World Peace Congress in Moscow on 26 October.\* Moscow's overriding concern about detente was also evidenced by its generally circumspect public treatment of U.S. actions in the Middle East throughout the crisis. At the same time, however, Moscow's pique over the U.S. "precautionary" military alert and its public rationale was conveyed both directly in the 27 October TASS statement and indirectly in replay of Western press speculation that the alert was prompted by the Administration's Watergate difficulties. Until now, Moscow has scrupulously avoided attempts to exploit the Watergate affair publicly.

**BREZHNEV SPEECH** In reviewing the international situation, Brezhnev focused mainly on the accomplishments of recent Soviet diplomacy and the prospects for further progress. While conceding the considerable effort needed to overcome the remaining "traces of the cold war," he nonetheless characterized the transition from cold war to detente as the "main trend" in contemporary world affairs. Expressing confidence about the "good prospects" for U.S.-Soviet cooperation, he specifically mentioned the President's scheduled return visit to Moscow next year. He also went out of his way to acknowledge the role played by "those statesmen of Western countries striving to overcome cold war inertia and embark on a new road." Brezhnev's posture of confidence over the viability of detente was typified by his declaration that Moscow will continue on its present course "cutting through the small ripples of the hostile propaganda campaign against socialism."

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\* See the "Arab-Israeli Conflict" section of this TRENDS for a discussion of Brezhnev's remarks on the Middle East and Moscow's treatment of developments related to the Middle East crisis.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 24 -

In projecting an aura of optimism about detente, Brezhnev appeared to be deliberately playing down the complications of the Middle East crisis. In apparent response to the U.S. rationale for the military alert, he took issue with the "fantastic speculations" in "some NATO countries" regarding Soviet intentions in the Middle East. He expressed Soviet willingness to cooperate in solving the crisis and called for the adoption of a "more responsible, honest, and constructive approach" by others.

Brezhnev's determination to press forward on detente in the aftermath of the U.S. alert was underscored by the new ground he broke on the European force reductions issue, by his moderate treatment of the human rights issue at the European security conference, and in his elaboration of measures for ending the arms race. In the most detailed discussion to date by a Soviet leader of the issues of force reductions\* and human rights, he sought to strike a balance in the case of the latter between his optimistic "victory through contacts" approach at Alma-Ata in August and the uncompromising stand he took in Sofia in September against interference in Soviet internal affairs. He not only displayed unusual concern about the continuing arms race but also reiterated the Soviet UN proposal for reducing the military budgets of the great powers, implying that the effort to end the arms race was of overriding importance: "If we want detente and peace to be stable we must halt the arms race."

**TREATMENT OF ALERT** Moscow's initial reaction to the U.S. military alert was cautious, in line with its generally circumspect treatment of the United States during the Middle East crisis. The alert was not explicitly acknowledged in Soviet media until after the President's news conference on the evening of 26 October. The coverage of Secretary Kissinger's press conference on the 25th notably highlighted his denial of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation and his remarks on cooperation between the two powers to contain the conflict. But the press conference brought in its wake a tougher stance. Though the 27 October TASS report of the press conference emphasized his discussion of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the crisis, it went on to dismiss what it called his attempts to justify the alert.

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\* For a further discussion of these remarks, see the article on European force reductions in this TRENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 15 -

Neither the TASS statement nor subsequent Soviet comment has acknowledged the worldwide scope of the U.S. alert. But Moscow's pique over the alert and its public rationale was evident in a TASS dispatch on the 29th citing articles in the New York TIMES and the British press that implied the alert was an overreaction prompted by the Administration's difficulties over Watergate rather than by considerations of foreign affairs. The dispatch broke the long-standing Soviet embargo on speculation about Watergate, and it contrasted with the earlier factual reports on the subject which appeared sympathetic to the President and clearly differentiated between the President's domestic difficulties and the bipartisan support for his policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union.

**STRESS ON DETENTE** Despite the firm though belated response to the alert, Moscow has continued to publicize the benefits of U.S.-Soviet cooperation. Six hours after carrying the TASS statement on the alert, for example, the news agency reported Senator Fulbright's observation that the improvement in bilateral relations had promoted the Middle East ceasefire. Moscow domestic radio on 30 October reported Western press commentary on Brezhnev's Moscow speech highlighting his optimism about the future of East-West relations.

The theme of the overriding importance of detente had been reiterated in Soviet media since the onset of the new Middle East crisis. An 18 October IZVESTIYA editorial, after citing one of Brezhnev's recent statements on the current worldwide trend toward detente, went on to minimize the Middle East conflict and the recent events in Chile: "Despite difficulties and temporary complications, the process of international relaxation is gathering strength. An awareness of the unacceptability and even inadmissibility of solving international disputes and contradictions by military means is penetrating increasingly deeply into the political circles and broad people's masses of many countries." Three days later, in the weekly domestic radio roundtable on international affairs, Radio-TV commentator Aleksandr Druzhinin opened the discussion with a similar observation: "I would like to lay particular emphasis on the following. However involved the international situation may be, analysis of the processes taking place in the world arena shows that the trend toward detente continues to gain momentum."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 16 -

In keeping with this approach, Moscow has been careful in its treatment of U.S. actions and intentions in the Middle East. For example, an article by Mikhail Sagatelyan in the 17 October LITERARY GAZETTE noted signs of restraint shown by "high U.S. officials" during the renewed fighting and cautioned that "only politically immature people" could fail to take this into consideration in assessing the situation.

**LIMITS OF DETENTE** Not unexpectedly, Soviet military leaders have offered a somewhat different reaction to the events in the Middle East, calling attention to the limitations of detente. In commemorating the World War II battle for the Caucasus in PRAVDA on 8 October, two days after the war broke out, Soviet Defense Minister Grechko cited the Middle East fighting as evidence that "imperialism's reactionary forces still regard war as a means for achieving their aggressive objectives"--a formulation rarely used in the media since the Vietnam ceasefire agreement and Moscow's subsequent public deemphasis on the specter of a Western military threat.

Three days later, in a Warsaw speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Polish armed forces, Grechko again returned to the theme of opposition to detente by reactionary forces in the West and urged socialist states to "increase their political vigilance and the combat readiness of the armed forces." However, the version of his speech published in the Soviet central press on 12 October did not include his further observation, as reported by Polish radio on the 11th, that the reactionary forces were intent on "the development of preparations for war." A RED STAR editorial on the Polish anniversary, in the paper's 17 October issue, also tailored Grechko's outspoken remarks to the current official position. The editorial quoted almost verbatim Grechko's warning about the remaining obstacles to detente, but in listing the measures required of socialist states in response, it replaced Grechko's appeal for an increase in combat readiness with a more modest call for "maintenance of the armed forces at the necessary level of combat readiness."

Warsaw Pact commander-in-chief Yakubovskiy, also speaking on the occasion of the Polish army anniversary, offered a similar analysis of the recent events. As reported in SOVIET BELORUSSIA on 13 October, Yakubovskiy said that "the events of recent days have confirmed once again that there still exist in the world forces of reaction and aggression who would not mind a return to the cold war period. Moreover they are stepping up their

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 17 -

activity and trying to provoke military conflicts . . . This is why we must tirelessly increase revolutionary vigilance and strengthen the defense capability of the socialist states and the Warsaw Pact."

#### MOSCOW EXPLOITS U.S.-EUROPE RIFT OVER MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Moscow has mounted a modest propaganda campaign to exploit the rift in NATO ranks exposed by the series of U.S. public charges that the European allies had failed to support U.S. policy during the Middle East crisis. In a series of commentaries beginning immediately after these disclosures, Moscow sought to fan the flames of controversy by dilating on what it describes as European resentment of U.S. highhandedness. Of the two issues said to have provoked the rift--the U.S. policy of supplying arms to Israel, and the U.S. failure to consult its allies before ordering the military alert on 25 October--Moscow devoted by far the greater attention to the latter. Prague alone of Moscow's East European allies has thus far joined in this campaign.

**ARMS FOR ISRAEL** Moscow's first reactions to the controversy were registered in a series of TASS dispatches on 27 October reporting press reactions in various Western capitals to the U.S. charges. The most detailed discussion of the issue of the U.S. shipment of war supplies to Israel was in a Bonn-dated FRAVDA dispatch on 27 October describing West German views on the disagreement between Bonn and Washington over the U.S. use of German-based facilities and equipment for this purpose. Referring to West German press comment on the FRG's protest to Washington over the arms supply operation, the article implied that the federal government's concern for its neutral status was belated at best, and it suggested broadly that the U.S. supply operation had been carried out with West German tolerance, if not collusion. It even hinted that this operation might still be going on, despite the protest.

Prague, in commenting on the same issue in a domestic service broadcast on 29 October, reflected similar skepticism regarding the sincerity of the Europeans' concern over their "neutral" status. It said that this was due not to any opposition to Israeli expansionism but simply to a pragmatic concern not to jeopardize oil supplies from the Arab countries. The

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 18 -

same theme was struck in another Prague domestic service commentary on 30 October, which cast the controversy in the broader context of NATO alliance relationships. Asserting that crisis situations always brought out the internal contradictions in the alliance, it implied that each member in the present situation was looking out for its own interests.

U.S. MILITARY ALERT      Moscow has been much more sharply critical of the United States in connection with the second issue said to have provoked the rift--the U.S. ordering of a military alert of its armed forces on 25 October. Echoing the tone of Brezhnev's allusion to the episode in his 26 October speech, the Soviet comment has derided the U.S. claim that the action was justified by Soviet readiness measures. It has also asserted that the action has damaged U.S. relations with its NATO allies, supporting its assertion with reports of West European complaints that the United States acted without consulting its allies. Finally, departing from the policy of restraint it has observed regarding the Watergate affair, it has broadly hinted that U.S. domestic political considerations played a role in prompting the U.S. action.

Following the TASS statement which first explicitly mentioned the U.S. alert, TASS dispatches on the same day began to report negative reactions from various Western news sources. The New York TIMES was reported as saying that the U.S. action in calling an alert without consulting its allies was strongly resented in West European capitals. A London-dated lined dispatch reported "many English newspapers" as saying that "Washington had carried its sabre-rattling too far." The same dispatch reported that British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home had told the House of Commons that the British Government had "no information on any Soviet actions that could give cause for concern."

The Watergate affair was brought in for the first time in a domestic service broadcast on the 23th. Referring to what it described as U.S. and British press skepticism regarding the official explanation for the alert, it asserted that these sources were expressing the opinion that the action was prompted by the desire to divert attention from the "domestic difficulties now facing the government." It quoted New York TIMES columnist James Reston as saying that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 19 -

the Administration needs a "crisis a day" to protect itself from domestic criticism. It also quoted the GUARDIAN as saying that the decision was made for domestic reasons.

By the 30th, Moscow began to apply a broader editorial gloss to these reports on Western opinion, with the purpose apparently of setting them in the context of a more positive assessment of the long-term trends in East-West relations. While continuing to report West European criticisms of the U.S. action, it presented them not simply as evidence of a Western squabble but as signs of a change in European attitudes that augured well for the future of detente.

An IZVESTIYA article on the 30th, for example, interpreted the episode as indicating that Europe "has left the 'cold war' period behind." It went on to assert that the "principle of peaceful coexistence is affirming itself," and that the principles that are being worked out at the all-European conference are becoming "vitally essential for both the West European states and the countries and peoples of all continents." And PRAVDA on the same day quoted extensively from a GUARDIAN editorial which, though sharply critical of the United States, seemed to reflect an attitude more of sorrow than of anger. It quoted the paper as saying that the moves toward detente in Europe and toward mutual balanced force reductions "will not prosper unless each of the two parties--the Western one as well as the Eastern--are united in their purposes."

BACKGROUND Moscow's reports of West European reactions to the U.S. charges were clearly selective and had the effect of distorting the overall European reaction. As Hamburg's DPA reported from Brussels on 29 October, the general tendency among European spokesmen has been to avoid dramatizing the conflict and to avoid public statements that might add fuel to the fire.

Moreover, along with the angry recriminations from a number of West European newspapers, there have been some remarkably sympathetic interpretations of the U.S. actions from other. The London TIMES on 27 October, for example, termed the U.S. military alert a "justified and unavoidable" measure and discounted the notion that domestic pressures prompted the U.S. decision. The GUARDIAN, on the same date, while

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 20 -

criticizing the United States for failing to take its allies into its confidence, argued solemnly that the allies should have a share in decisions that might involve the possibility of nuclear war. And LE MONDE, while criticizing the U.S. action as an "overreaction," said that the U.S. desire to exclude the troops of the superpowers from the Middle East was "understandable." Many West German newspapers have expressed regret over the incident and embarrassment at the FRG's role in provoking the crisis. The London OBSERVER's comment on 28 October that Bonn was "stunned and hurt" by the U.S. criticism seems to accurately reflect a broad cross-section of opinion expressed in the West German press.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 21 -

## BREZHNEV DETAILS MOSCOW'S VIEWS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS

Brezhnev in his speech at the World Congress of Peace Forces on the 26th set the stage for the opening on the 30th of the European force reduction negotiations in Vienna by giving the most detailed public discussion to date of related issues by a Soviet leader. In the course of a general discussion of some of the points which Moscow will apparently raise in Vienna, Brezhnev stated directly that the negotiations will decide on what basis any reductions will take place--either "equal numbers" or "equal percentages"--and thus seemed to open the door to the possibility of a greater numerical reduction of forces on the part of the USSR than of the United States. Brezhnev added the following new emphases or clarifications to Soviet positions:

- + That air forces should be included in the reductions. Although this has been implicit in previous Soviet positions, it has not been publicly specified in leadership statements. Brezhnev called for the reduction of "foreign and national land and air forces of the countries participating in the negotiations." This serves to accent the Soviet professions of concern over Western "forward based systems."
- + That nuclear armed units should be included. This again specifies a point that had been implicit in previous Soviet positions and reflects the same concern with Western "forward based systems." Brezhnev's words were: "Obviously one must admit that the reduction also should apply to units with nuclear weapons."
- + That the reductions should begin to be implemented as early as 1975. This is the first time that a Soviet leader has publicly specified a date for which agreements can be reached at the negotiations. Brezhnev also implied that earlier, partial agreements can also be achieved. He said that the USSR "would be ready for realistic steps . . . as early as 1975" and added that "in the early future it might be possible to conclude concrete agreements on this."
- + That either "equal numbers" or "equal percentages" should be used as the basis for reductions. Brezhnev said that the negotiations themselves will have to decide whether any reductions will be based on "an equal percentage reduction" or on an "equal number." But regardless of how this question is settled, he said, "it is important that the future reduction not disturb the existing balance of power in central Europe and the European continent in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 22 -

general" and that no side should achieve a one-sided advantage at the expense of the other. This appears to be the most forthcoming statement by a Soviet leader on the Soviet Union's willingness to negotiate the issue of reduction ratios.

ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS      The issue of whether any force reductions in Europe will be on the basis of equal numbers or equal percentages--with the latter implying, in effect, an asymmetrical solution in terms of absolute numbers--was broached in an article by D. Proektor in the September issue of WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. The article reviewed Soviet attitudes toward European security in the postwar period. It included a brief discussion of force reductions which strongly implies that Moscow's concept of "equal" reductions does not necessarily exclude all elements of the Western concept of "balanced" reductions. Routinely discounting allegations in the West that the military balance in Europe favors the Soviet Union and that this means the USSR should reduce its forces by "a far greater number of troops than the Western side," Proektor went on to say:

The formulation of solutions adequate for the actual situation demands a precise appraisal of the effectiveness of the existing armed forces and armaments in Europe and of their correlation, basing, and mutual opportunities for reinforcement, proceeding from the nature of the regions of deployment and the varied conditions for transferring troops and so forth. Certain concepts of an "asymmetrical" reduction of troops are not based on an objective and impartial analysis of all components of the problem of reducing forces and arms in central Europe. (emphasis added)

The article by Proektor, who is a staff member of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO) and a specialist on European military and disarmament issues, appears to suggest that Moscow does not totally exclude all Western ideas about balanced reductions. It certainly goes beyond the last serious discussion of force reductions in the same journal in 1972 by one of Proektor's colleagues at IMEMO and a specialist on force reductions, Yuriy Kostko.\* Kostko rejected outright the NATO concept of "asymmetrical" or "balanced" reductions. On the other hand, Proektor's brief

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\* For a review of two Kostko articles see the TRENDS for 12 October 1972, pages 15-19.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 23 -

passage echoed in part Kostko's long discussion of the necessity to take into consideration not only the tactical and strategic balance in central Europe but also the continental European and global military situations, as well as the interrelationship (correlation) for all types of weapons.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 24 -

## INDOCHINA

## HANOI RADIO SUSPENDS BROADCAST OF "CHIEN BINH" ARTICLES

Hanoi domestic service has for the present discontinued broadcasting the texts of articles on U.S. global strategy by the authoritative commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant) that have been published in several issues of the military newspaper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN since 22 October. The first articles in the series appeared in the paper on 22 and 23 October and were broadcast in three installments on the 24th, 25th, and 26th.\* The radio has not broadcast any articles since the 26th; however, press reviews carried by VNA and Hanoi radio have indicated that more articles in the series have been published: Another article, said by the press review to deal with the "new Atlantic Charter," appeared in the paper on the 25th; and the paper on the 30th was said to have published "part four" in the series, discussing the U.S. strategy of "realistic deterrence." The 31 October radio press review provided more detail on that day's article, noting its title was "The Reactionary Coup in Chile and Local Strategic Countermeasures" and summarizing it at some length.

In 1969, when a similar series of six articles by Chien Binh was appearing in the press, the articles were all eventually broadcast by the radio, with never more than a four-day lag between publication and broadcast time.

## DRV DEFENSE MINISTER GIAP HAS AGAIN DROPPED OUT OF SIGHT

North Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, who was absent from public view from July through mid-September this year, has again stopped appearing in public.\*\* His last known appearance was on 6 October, when he accompanied visiting NLFSV chairman Nguyen Huu Tho on a tour of a

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\* The first two broadcast installments--identified as "part one" of the series--are reported in the TRENDS of 25 October 1973, pages 17-18.

\*\* Giap's July-September absence is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 September 1973, pages 11-12.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 25 -

military school. His continued activity as defense minister was confirmed by messages sent in his name as late as 31 October; but he failed to appear with other Politburo members when Premier Pham Van Dong departed for East Europe on 16 October, and on 28 October he was not among the host of military figures who turned out for the funeral of Vice Minister of Education Major General Le Chuong.

Le Duc Tho was the only other Politburo member not known to be out of the country who failed to appear at the Le Chuong funeral. Giap's absence was more surprising than Tho's, however, because the deceased had a long army career prior to 1971, when he was given his post in the Ministry of Education. Perhaps to avoid calling further attention to Giap's failure to appear, Hanoi radio's account of the funeral only acknowledged the wreath sent by Pham Van Dong, and did not indicate whether one was sent by the defense minister, as might have been expected on the death of a former army comrade.

#### PHAM VAN DONG DELEGATION CONCLUDES CZECHOSLOVAK-DRV AID PACT

New aid agreements covering Czechoslovakia's economic and military assistance to the DRV in 1974 were concluded during the 23-28 October visit by a North Vietnamese delegation led by Premier Pham Van Dong. While Hanoi's account of the joint communique at the conclusion of the visit acknowledged the agreements covered military aid, RUDE PRAVO's text of the communique and Prague's reports on the signing of the agreements referred only to economic and "technical" assistance. The fact that a RUDE PRAVO commentary on the visit did acknowledge that military aid was also involved suggests possible confusion over how the agreement was to be publicized. Prague has announced the cancellation of previous DRV debts, following the pattern set by Moscow and other East European capitals--with the exception of Warsaw and Bucharest--during Dong's visits in recent months.

The joint communique routinely noted Prague's "full support" for the demand of the DRV and PRG that the United States and Saigon strictly implement the Paris agreement and for the PRG's 28 June six-point proposal. Both the DRV and Prague accounts of the communique used Hanoi's formula

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 26 -

recognizing the PRG as the "sole and real representative" of the South Vietnamese people--a concession Dong had not gained in any other East European capital he visited except Bucharest. During the visit President Svoboda and First Secretary Husak received Dong, and Premier Strougal hosted a reception for him.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
11 OCTOBER 1973

- 27 -

## U S S R

## THEORETICAL DISPUTE OVER ECONOMIC PLANNING CONTINUES UNABATED

Conservative Soviet economists are continuing harsh attacks on the innovative school of mathematical economics led by N.P. Fedorenko, Director of the Central Mathematical Economics Institute (TsEMI) in Moscow, despite a June 1973 PRAVDA article warning against such abusive criticism. The Fedorenko group has been under constant attack during the past decade for advancing theories involving the replacement of the traditional system of rigid, legally binding five-year plans by a flexible system of long-term forecasts that could be adjusted each year to changing needs. The conservative economists' chief target has been TsEMI's so-called "System for the Optimal Functioning of the Economy" (SOFE)--a mathematical model of the Soviet system that Fedorenko and his associates have been developing over many years to serve as the theoretical framework for much of their practical research.

**LATEST FLARE-UP** The most recent phase of the dispute was triggered by a series of sharp attacks on SOFE and its protagonists in the Gosplan monthly PLANNED ECONOMY. Attacks in the July, September, and October 1972 and the May 1973 issues of the publication were authored by conservative economists A. Kats, Ya. Kronrod and Yu. Belik. Kats and Kronrod are members of the Economics Institute, a stronghold of conservatism, while Belik is a consultant to the planning and financial organs section of the CPSU Central Committee. The critical articles were distinguished by the use of such scathing epithets as "subjective-voluntarist," "alien" and "infantile disorder" to describe the theoretical work of the Fedorenko group.

The abusive nature of the criticism was apparently offensive even to the editors of PRAVDA, who on 4 June 1973 published a short review article by I. Solovyev scolding the Gosplan journal for publishing such "tendentious" articles.\* Citing Brezhnev's praise of mathematical economics, systems analysis and other economic innovations, Solovyev criticized the conservative economists by name for attempting to "run down the creative searchings of Soviet scientists," questioning "important theses of party documents,"

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\* For an analysis of the PRAVDA article, see TRENDS OF 13 June 1973, pages 20-21

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 28 -

and falsely accusing their adversaries of having rejected "directive planning." The PRAVDA article defended the cause of economic innovation without mentioning the Fedorenko group and its controversial theory of optimal planning; however, it was clearly intended as a warning against the notorious methods of ideological abuse and character assassination employed in past disputes.

**JUNE MEETING** Instead of being intimidated, the conservatives simply struck back harder. The editors of **PLANNED ECONOMY** called an editorial meeting in late June which heard a torrent of abusive criticism of SOFE and its protagonists by their long-time opponents in Gosplan and the economic profession at large. Those addressing the meeting, reported in the October 1973 issue of the Gosplan journal, encouraged the journal to continue its polemics--in clear disregard of PRAVDA's rebuke.

Gosplan Deputy Chairman A. V. Bachurin, a long-time Fedorenko critic, opened the one-sided debate by attacking SOFE on ideological grounds as a departure from the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. The economist Kronrod pointed to the alien origins of SOFE, particularly its reliance on bourgeois concepts of price formation and other attributes of "market socialism." Another old adversary of the Fedorenko group, A. Ya. Boyarskiy, Director of the Central Statistical Administration's research institute, declared that "during the ten years of SOFE's existence practice has confirmed its uselessness." Academy of Social Sciences economist M. Z. Bor accused the authors of SOFE of having created a "myth" that SOFE and methods of mathematical economics are inseparable, and he called SOFE a "sad incident" in the history of Soviet planning. N. P. Lebedinskiy, deputy chairman of Gosplan and chief of its main computer center, assailed the authors of SOFE for opposing the directive nature of plans and declared the theory incompatible with the Soviet planning system. Leading computer authority V. M. Glushkov, Director of the Ukrainian Institute of Cybernetics, expressed his "full" agreement with Lebedinskiy. Belik and Kats likewise joined in the general condemnation of the theoretical work of the Fedorenko group. In summing up the "discussion," Bachurin again accused his foes of borrowing Western ideas "contradicting Marxist-Leninist economic teachings."

**CONTINUED COUNTERATTACK** The Gosplan group pressed its attack in the September 1973 issue of **PLANNED ECONOMY**, signed to press in early August. The lead editorial emphasized the unsuitability of SOFE for the development of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 29 -

mathematical-economic models on grounds that it undermines the inviolability of plans. In the lead article of the issue, Lebedinskiy reiterated that SOFE "cannot be used in socialist planning" since it would threaten the inviolability of five-year plans and lead to a devolution of authority in the formulation of annual plans. Economist A. Zalkind, writing in the same issue about the relationship between light industry and heavy industry, questioned the utility of SOFE in establishing economic priorities.

The editorial and the articles by Lebedinskiy and others particularly emphasized the incompatibility of SOFE with the ongoing Gosplan project to unite all departmental and branch computer systems into a single national system of collecting and processing information for economic planning and management. The project--officially termed "the Automated System of Planning Calculations" (ASPR)--is being carried out by Gosplan with the participation of more than 100 scientific organizations, including TsEMI.

The same issue of PLANNED ECONOMY also carried a sharply critical review of a collection of articles entitled "Planning, Administration and Evaluation of Effectiveness of Scientific Research and Work" issued by Fedorenko's institute at the beginning of 1973. The book's criticisms of planning defects and poor management of scientific research clearly irritated the reviewers, who harshly attacked the work, countered its charges, and called the mathematical methods proposed in the book either "unclear" or of "very dubious value." The review singled out Fedorenko's contribution to the book for special criticism, accusing him of immodesty in his requests for more money for scientific work and his treating of SOFE as a "prime example" of the success of such endeavor.

**BACKGROUND** Since its establishment in 1963, TsEMI has been a leading proponent of the large-scale application of mathematical methods to improve the planning system. In advancing proposals for basic reforms in economic planning and management, TsEMI has encountered stiff opposition from many quarters. TsEMI's far-reaching proposals on optimal planning have been consistently opposed by the Gosplan hierarchy and the overwhelmingly conservative school of political economists centered in the Economics Institute and the Academy of Social Sciences; and its views on industrial management have won far from complete acceptance among other innovative schools of mathematical economics, such as Glushkov's Ukrainian institute and V.A. Trapeznikov's Institute of Management Problems.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 30 -

Nonetheless, in the space of a decade TsEMI has grown from a handful of researchers to a staff of 1000 professionals and has gained recognition as one of the leading institutions of its kind in the Soviet Union. This was officially acknowledged in a 1969 review of the activities of TsEMI by the leadership of the USSR Academy of Sciences, reported in HERALD OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES No. 2, 1970.\* The review explicitly approved TsEMI's work on developing SOFE, as well as its contributions in the applied sciences. Moreover, since 1965 no less than eight members of TsEMI, including Fedorenko himself, have received prestigious state prizes for their theoretical and practical accomplishments.

TsEMI's record of achievement in a variety of specialized fields may explain its ability to thrive in the face of apparent adversity. On the other hand, the seriousness of the economic problems confronting the regime may explain why TsEMI has been permitted to develop and publicize theories that challenge the traditional planning system but offer promise of practical solutions in the future.

#### PRAVDA OFFICIAL REBUKES SOVIET PRESS FOR SOFTNESS ON ZIONISM

Disenchantment of certain reactionary Soviet circles with the official Soviet policy of discouraging conspicuous manifestations of anti-Semitism was clearly reflected in a September QUESTIONS OF HISTORY article complaining about inadequate criticism of Zionism by Soviet publications. The article by V. V. Bolshakov, deputy secretary of PRAVDA's editorial board in charge of the newspaper's international departments, was also notable for its praise of the most notorious Soviet critics of Zionism, Yuriy Ivanov and Trokhim Kichko.

The 36-year old Bolshakov has built his career as a cold war polemicist and an anti-Zionist propagandist, first as deputy foreign editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in the late 1960's and, after moving to PRAVDA in 1970, as a frequent PRAVDA contributor on the Vietnam

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\* It is noteworthy that the work of the Economics Institute was also favorably assessed in the 1969 review, only to be criticized later in a December 1971 CPSU Central Committee decree for concentrating on abstract doctrinal matters rather than on practical economic concerns.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 31 -

war and U.S. propaganda warfare. He was elevated to his present post by mid-1972, and has authored one book and several journal and newspaper articles on Zionism. His ardent anti-Zionist, if not openly anti-Semitic, activities have certainly not impeded his professional advancement.

Bolshakov complained that starting in the 1930's international Zionists managed to discredit all anti-Zionist writings as anti-Semitic, thereby preventing even Soviet researchers from writing anti-Zionist articles. He criticized the first and second editions of the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA, issued during the three decades after 1930, for making only "very minimal" criticism of Zionism. A change occurred, he explained, after the Israeli "aggressions" of 1956 and especially 1967, when the Soviet press began printing anti-Zionist articles. But, he complained, "because of carelessness or even some other reason," the Soviet press continues to use "absolutely incorrect terms such as 'the Jewish people' and even 'the Jewish nation.'" While praising the new, third edition of the encyclopedia as much tougher on Zionism than the previous editions, Bolshakov still found objectionable passages. For instance, he insisted that the article on "Jews" should refer to them as "ethnic groups" not as a "nationality."

As examples of proper treatment of Zionism, Bolshakov singled out the writings of the two most notorious Soviet anti-Zionists, Yuriy Ivanov and Trokhim Kichko. He praised the "brilliant" articles of Ivanov and declared that his 1969 book "Caution--Zionism" has received "wide recognition both in the USSR and abroad." And he lauded the writings of Kichko "in the Ukrainian language" as the "only serious work" on the ties of Judaism with Zionism. He cited Kichko's 1968 book "Judaism and Zionism" and his 1972 book "Zionism--Enemy of the Youth," but neglected to mention Kichko's 1963 book "Judaism Without Embellishment," which stirred an angry outcry in the West and was repudiated by Soviet authorities. Alarmed by the growing "anti-Soviet propaganda campaign" against the Soviet nationality policy aroused by the 1963 book, IZVESTIYA on 5 April 1964 criticized the work for passages "which can be interpreted in a spirit contradicting the policy of our state."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 OCTOBER 1973

- 32 -

## NOTE

WORLD PEACE CONGRESS: Brezhnev's keynote address on 26 October to the World Peace Congress, the principal event of Moscow's gathering of peace forces, professed the conviction that detente is the "main tendency" in international relations. At the same time, Brezhnev referred to such negative phenomena as "Israeli aggression," the Chilean "fascist junta," the Chinese leadership's "unprincipled" foreign policy, and critics of Soviet internal affairs. TASS reports suggest that the proceedings of the congress generally reflected the tone and substance of Brezhnev's remarks. The Sino-Soviet issue apparently surfaced during the working sessions. A Brazilian delegate, assailing Peking's foreign policy, stated that "all" commissions engaged in drafting documents concluded that the "Maoists" were no longer loyal to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. In the first PRC report to date on the congress, NCNA on the 30th attacked Brezhnev for his remarks on the need to call a halt to the arms race while "on the very day and in the next two days, the Soviet Union conducted four nuclear explosions successively."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
31 OCTOBER 1973

- 1 -

# A P P E N D I X

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 22 - 28 OCTOBER 1973

<u>Moscow (259 1/2 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1125 items)</u>		
World Peace Congress	(4%)	31%	Middle East	(23%)	42%
in Moscow, 25-31 Oct.			[UNGA, Security	(--)	21%]
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	15%]	Council Debate		
Middle East	(19%)	17%	Domestic Issues	(46%)	41%
[USSR Government	(--)	4%]	Indochina	(7%)	5%
Statement on Cease-			[Cambodian UN	(4%)	3%]
Fire Violations			Membership		
[TASS Statement on	(--)	4%]	23d Anniversary of	(--)	3%
U.S. Military Alert			Chinese "Volunteers"		
China	(13%)	5%	Entry into Korean War		
Chilean Coup	(6%)	4%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.